We study cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) around national elections in 47 countries between 2001 and 2010. Our results show that the year before a national election is associated with greater volume of outbound cross-border M&As. An acquisition deal is more likely to be cross-border and increase acquirer's announcement returns in the year before a national election. Across countries, this relation is stronger in countries with lower checks and balances, presidential systems and lower level of shareholder protection, which are more likely to experience higher political uncertainty associated with forthcoming national election. Within countries, this relation is weaker when elections with high likelihood to reappoint incumbent leader and stronger when a new leader is more likely to win. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms strategically time cross-border acquisitions and diversify political uncertainty abroad before national elections.
Introduction
The impact of politics on investment has received a great deal of attention. Political uncertainty associated with possible changes in national leadership is an important way through which politics can influence investment. At the macro level, political instability and violent events can lead to reductions in aggregate investment (Barro, 1991; Pindyck and Solimano, 1993; and Alesina and Perotti, 1996) . At the micro level, Julio and Yook (2012) find that firms reduce their capital expenditures in the presence of electoral uncertainty.
In this paper, we study how political uncertainty affects cross-border acquisitions.
The case of cross-border acquisitions presents an intriguing setting to get at questions yet to be answered by the prior studies. First, recent works by Pá stor and Veronesi (2012, 2013) , and Boutchkova et al. (2012) identify large costs associated with political uncertainty and hence highlight the importance of role of coping with such risks. Being one of the most salient investment decisions, acquisitions, especially cross-border acquisitions must take into account political environment and uncertainty, both at home and abroad. Second, outbound cross-border acquisition involves a target abroad, which is arguably less subject to domestic political uncertainty and can even shield the firm from domestic political uncertainty by -voting with your feet‖. Third, while most studies of the determinants of cross-border acquisitions focus on economic and cultural factors (see, e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Ferreira et al., 2010; Erel et al., 2012; Ahern et al. 2013) , it is important to understand the role political factors play in affecting the incidence and outcome of cross-border acquisitions.
We put forward two hypotheses regarding how political uncertainty can affect cross-border acquisitions. The first hypothesis (waiting hypothesis) posits that firms reduce acquisitions of foreign targets in the period before the resolve of political uncertainty. Bernanke (1983) shows that events whose long-run implications are uncertain can increase the returns to waiting for new information, particularly when the source of uncertainty periodically renews itself over time. As shown in Julio and Yook (2012) , uncertainties associated with possible policy change increase the value of waiting to invest as the outcome will have implications for how firms allocate investment expenditures.
An alternative hypothesis (uncertainty diversifying hypothesis) makes an opposite empirical prediction, i.e., acquisitions of foreign targets would increase for firms facing high political uncertainty. The intuition is an application of the theory of portfolio selection under uncertainty: outbound cross-border M&A helps firm diversify its sources of income, which reduces the total risk of firm's operation (Severn, 1974; Rugman, 1976; Brewer, 1981; Fatemi, 1984; Michel and Shaked, 1986) . If a firm engages in both domestic and foreign operations, the risk arising from political uncertainty could be diversified as long as the economic fluctuations of the home country and host country are not perfectly correlated. Previous research provides evidence that firms deliberately avoid political uncertainty and instability of home country through outward investment (See, e.g., Tallman, 1988; Le and Zak, 2006) .
A cross-border acquisition is itself a risky investment and takes long to complete.
If the acquirer intends to diversify the political uncertainty through acquisition, we expect such an acquisition to take place well before such uncertainty is resolved.
Therefore, we focus on the year before the resolve of political uncertainty when we carry out the empirical analysis.
To test the above two hypotheses, we focus on the political uncertainty surrounding national elections and study cross-border M&A deals of 47 countries around their national elections between 2001 and 2010. As indicated in Rodrik (1991) , it is difficult to attribute outcomes of corporate behavior to political uncertainty as the two are endogenously determined. For example, an economic downturn could generate a great deal of political uncertainty. In this paper, we study political uncertainty associated with national elections (see Bialkowski et al., 2008; Boutchkova et al., 2012; Julio and Yook, 2012) . National elections, which are generally pre-determined in terms of timing by a country's laws but often random in terms of election outcomes and ensuing policy changes, provide us with an exogenous setting to examine political influence on cross-border M&A deals. Another reason that national elections make a good setting is that different countries have different election times, which provides us with abundant variation in political uncertainty across countries and over time.
Our findings show that the number of cross-border M&A deals increases in the year before a national election. This result is robust to including factors that previous studies have shown to influence cross-border M&A (such as economic development, legal origin, quality of institutions and trade openness), sub-sample analysis which excludes deals originating from the US and UK, different model specifications and different measures of the volume of cross-border M&As. This effect is economically significant; relative to years without a forthcoming national election, the number of cross-border M&A deals is 14% higher in the year prior to a national election. In addition, there is no such effect in the year two years before a national election, the election year, or the year after a national election when the political uncertainty is much lower compared to the year before a national election. These results support the uncertainty-diversifying hypothesis that more firms choose to acquire foreign target when domestic political uncertainty is high.
We also examine whether our results could be explained by alternative explanations. Political uncertainty is not the only mechanism through which real outcomes can be affected around the timing of elections. One alternative explanation for our result is that the increase in cross-border M&A volume is a result of underlying economic forces. If this is true, we expect the volume of domestic M&A deals to increase in the year before a national election, as the better macroeconomic fundamental directly affect firms' domestic investment. However, our results show that there is no increase in the number of domestic M&A deals and the value of domestic deals is significantly lower during the year before a national election.
Therefore, in the year prior to a national election, firms favor acquiring targets overseas rather than at home. This evidence further supports our uncertainty diversifying hypothesis.
We next investigate whether the effect of political uncertainty before national election varies across countries. We conjecture that the increases in the volume of cross-border M&As will be more pronounced in countries with a higher probability of policy changes or a wider range of possible policy outcomes after the national election. We first compare elections in countries with a presidential system with those with a parliamentary system. As documented in Julio and Yook (2012), compared to parliamentary systems, presidential systems are associated with higher degree of checks and balances, which constrains national leader's decisions. Hence, larger policy swings are less likely to occur following a change in political power in presidential systems. We therefore expect that parliamentary systems will have a higher propensity for large policy swings, generating more outbound cross-border M&As relative to presidential systems. We also apply a direct measure of checks and balances obtained from the World Bank. This measure contains some time-series variation within countries, even though electoral rules and legal institutions are largely fixed over time. Thus, we expect that the increases of cross-border M&As to be more pronounced in countries with lower checks and balances. In addition, we expect that in countries with less protection of minority shareholder, firms are more likely to acquire foreign targets in the year before a national election. This is because that the level of shareholder protection is unlikely to change greatly after the transfer of political power, and higher level of shareholder protection limits the range of possible policy outcomes. Our results provide support to these hypotheses, i.e., the increase in the volume of cross-border M&As is greater in countries with fewer checks and balances, and shorter tenure of current system, parliamentary systems, civil law origin and lower level of minority shareholder protection.
Within countries, we hypothesis that the increase in outbound cross-border M&A deals will be larger when economic policies are more likely to change after national election. If incumbent leader is more likely to win than other competitors, old economic policies are expected to continue and hence less political uncertainty associated with economic policies in the next few years. On the other hand, if national leader is very likely to be replaced by a new one, new economic policy would be applied and its economic outcome is uncertainty. Therefore, we expect the year before elections with a high likelihood of reappointment of incumbent leader will be associated with less outbound cross-border M&As, and the year before elections with a high likelihood of national leader change will be associated with more outbound cross-border M&As. While the degree of uncertainty prior to the election outcome is unobservable, we can observe the actual vote counts from the elections and use the results to classify elections as either reappointment of incumbent leader or appointment of a new leader. Accordingly, we set a -Reappointment‖ dummy to one if the winner is incumbent leader and the vote difference is greater than the first quartile value of the sample distribution and a -New leader‖ dummy to one if the winner is a new leader and the vote difference is greater than the first quartile value of the sample distribution, where vote difference is defined as the difference between the proportion of the votes garnered by the winner and that received by the runner-up.
Our results support these expectations, providing further support for uncertainty diversifying hypothesis.
We also use bilateral data on M&As to test our hypothesis by forming pairs of acquirer country and target country. The results show that greater political uncertainty before national election in acquirer country is associated with greater number of bilateral M&A deals. This result continue to hold after controlling for difference in economic development, legal origination, quality of institutions and trade openness between acquirer nation and target nation as well as other determinants of bilateral country capital flow. Consistent with the country-level results, such an outcome only occurs in the year before a national election.
We next focus on acquirer's choice of target nation in the year before acquirer nation's national election. We expect that acquirers from countries with forthcoming elections will choose targets from countries with no elections in the year following the deal announcement; otherwise they would be exposed to both domestic and foreign political uncertainties at the same time. We test this hypothesis by separating our sample into two subsamples according to whether the target country has a national election in the year following the deal announcement year. Consistent with our expectation, the year just prior to the acquirer nation's national election only impose positive effect on cross-border M&As in the subsample whose targets are from countries with no national election in the following year.
The uncertainty diversifying hypothesis is also supported by deal level evidence.
We find that the in the year before acquirer nation's national election, acquisitions are more likely to be cross-border. This result provides us an additional robustness test of the effect of political uncertainty before national election on cross-border M&As.
We last investigate the announcement returns of cross-border M&As. We test whether acquiring foreign targets one year before a national election creates more value for acquiring firms' shareholders in cross-border deals. We find that cross-border acquisitions generate greater announcement returns to the acquiring firms before the resolve of political uncertainty. On average, the three-day announcement returns for a cross-border acquisition in our sample is 56% higher in the year prior acquirer nation's election. And there is no such effect among domestic M&A deals. Our results imply that the market reacts favorably to cross-border investments for diversification of political uncertainty.
Our study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it presents evidence of an important link between political process and cross-border M&As by documenting new patterns of M&A around the world, namely, an increased tendency of cross-border M&As in the year before national election. This paper relates to a burgeoning literature on the determinants of cross-border mergers (see, e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012; Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2012) . While most of these studies present cross-sectional determinants, we complement these papers by presenting time-series factors affecting firms' acquisition decisions. Second, this paper adds to the literature on the impact of political uncertainty on economic outcomes. Previous researches have studied the impact of politics on firms' investment expenditure (Julio and Yook, 2012, 2014; Liu, 2010 ), investment's sensitivity to stock price (Durnev, 2012) , capital structure (Desai et al., 2004 (Desai et al., , 2008 , stock price volatility (Pá stor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013) and bond issuance (Gao and Qi, 2013) . Our results shed light on the relation between politics and real economy by providing evidence that managers diversify political uncertainty in home country through outbound cross-border acquisitions.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the election data set and the sample of M&A deals. In Section 3, we conduct country-level analysis of the cross-border M&A activity surrounding national election. In Section 4, we perform country-pair analysis using bilateral data on M&A transactions. Section 5 presents deal-level results. Section 6 concludes.
Data sample and descriptive statistics

Election data
We obtain the election information data from the World Bank Database of 18,911 acquisition deals are done by US firms, and 2,606 of them are cross-border deals. 9,915 acquisition deals are done by UK firms, and 2,413 of them are cross-border deals. Still, other countries like Canada and Australia are also very active in cross-border acquisitions, and account for a significant portion of the total sample Table 2 presents the number of completed deals for each pair of acquirer country (columns) and target country (rows).
We collect a number of data items from SDC, including the acquirer's and target's names, the country of domicile and two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, deal value, as well as some other deal characteristics. We obtain stock return index (RI) from DataStream for acquirer firms and acquirer nation's market index to calculate acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns around deal announcement.
Country-level data
We obtain gross domestic product ( [Insert Table 1 around here]
[Insert Table 2 around here]
Country-Level Analysis
As we are interested in the impact of political uncertainty before national elections, we focus on the year just prior to acquirer nation's national election. We first present the main results on whether the volume of cross-border M&As in the year before acquirer country's national election is different from other periods. We next investigate whether the relation varies by country characteristics.
Main results
Figure 1 presents some preliminary evidence that firms acquire more foreign targets in the year before national elections than in other periods. However, this unconditional analysis doesn't control for other factors that may affect cross-border acquisitions, such as economic development, trade openness and legal institutions.
We formally test whether the volume of cross-border acquisitions differs in the year before national election in a parsimonious model as follows:
Ln(Number of cross-border M&A) One year before election
where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of cross-border M&A deals with acquirers from country i in year t. 2 In the robustness test, we reestimate our main test using the logarithm of the value of cross-border deals as an alternative measure of the volume of cross-border M&As. Previous researches on cross-border M&As using the logarithm of deal number or value as the measure of volume includes Ahern et al. (2013), Huizinga and Voget (2009) and di Giovanni (2005) . In our main tests, we use pooled OLS regression including only country-year observations with at least one cross-border deal. We estimate a Tobit censored regression model in the robustness checks to account for the truncation of observed merger activity at zero.
The year before national election is denoted by a dummy variable, One year before election, which equals one if year t is the year just prior to the year of the acquirer country i's national election. We adjust the t-statistics for within-country correlation by clustering the standard errors at acquirer country level.
X denotes the control variables, including one-year lagged value of the dependent variable, the level of minority shareholder protection indicated by a common law dummy, ICRG measures of investment profile and institution quality, economic development proxied by the logarithm of GDP per capita and the GDP annual growth rate, and the trade-to-GDP ratio. The regression results are reported in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 around here]
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that there is a significant increase in the volume of cross-border acquisitions in the year just prior to national elections in the acquirer nation. The magnitude of this effect is economically significant; compared to years without a forthcoming national election, the number of cross-border M&A deals is 14%
higher in the year before a national election. This result supports the hypothesis that firms do more outbound cross-border acquisitions to diversify internationally before 2 One may argue that it is more appropriate to use the ratio of cross-border M&A deals as the dependent variable, however, in the year before national election, domestic M&A may decrease as Julio and Yook (2012) have documented that firms reduce their investment before election, the ratio of cross-border deals could be high even if the acquisition of foreign targets doesn't increase. Our results continue to hold if we use the ratio.
the resolve of political uncertainty. In Column (2), we include dummies indicating other years surrounding national elections. The result shows that only one year before national election is associated with greater volume of outbound cross-border acquisitions whereas other years are not statistically significant.
In Columns (3) to (6), we reestimate our main specification by conducting different estimation methods. Column (3) reports the estimation result of a Tobit model taking into account that the dependent variable is above zero. The sample size increases to 470 country-year observations as the Tobit model also includes country-years with zero cross-border deal. Column (4) replaces the dependent variable with the logarithm of one plus the value of cross-border M&As. Consistent with the result reported in Column (1), result of Tobit model also shows an increase in the number volume of outbound cross-border M&As before election, and the value volume of outbound cross-border deals also increases in the year before national election.
we estimate the volume of domestic deals around the year before national election with four different measures of the volume of domestic deals. In Columns (1) and (2), we use the logarithm of one plus the number of domestic deals as the dependent variable. The result shows that there is no significant change in the number volume of domestic M&A deals before election. When we replace the volume measure of domestic deals as the logarithm of one plus the value of domestic deals, we find that the value volume is significantly lower in the year before national election. This is consistent with the phenomenon of investment reduction documented in Julio and Yook (2012). Columns (3) and (4) apply domestic ratio in terms of number and value respectively as alternative measures of domestic deals' volume, which is defined as the ratio of number or value of domestic deals to total number of domestic deals. The result shows that contrary to the prediction of electoral business cycle hypothesis, domestic ratio is lower in the year before national election. In Column (4), we replace the dependent variable as the domestic ratio calculated in terms of value, and find similar results. Therefore, these results deny the alternative explanation of electoral business cycle.
Country characteristics
According to the -uncertainty-diversifying‖ hypothesis, the increase in the volume of cross-border M&As would be more pronounced when the degree of political uncertainty regarding elections is higher. We test this prediction in this session. As discussed in the introduction, countries with parliamentary systems, lower degree of checks and balances, weaker protection of minority shareholder rights are expected to experience higher political uncertainty before elections. Therefore, the increase of outbound cross-border M&As before election is expected to be greater in these countries.
[Insert Table 5 around here]
To investigate these predictions, we first set a dummy variable taking a value of one if the political system is presidential system, and include the interaction of presidential system dummy with one year before election dummy. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 5 . The coefficient of the interaction term is not significant, while the coefficient of one year before election dummy is significantly positive. Consistent with our prediction, this result indicates that the parliamentary systems are associated greater volume of outbound cross-border deals before election.
We obtain measures of checks and balances from World Bank and interact it with one year before election dummy. The coefficient of this interaction is significantly negative, indicating the impact of the year before election on cross-border M&As is greater in countries with lower checks and balances.
To measure the protection level of minority shareholder's rights, we obtain common law dummy, antidirector rights and legal dummy from La Porta et al. (1998) , and interact these three variables with one year before election dummy. As shown in Panel A of Table 5 , the coefficients of the three interaction terms are all significantly negative. In other words, countries with lower level protection of minority shareholders' rights are associated with greater outbound cross-border M&As before election.
In sum, results in Panel A of Table 5 supports the prediction of -uncertainty diversifying‖ hypothesis that countries experiencing higher degree of political uncertainty before national election will have greater volume of outbound cross-border M&A transactions.
Within countries, the -uncertainty diversifying‖ hypothesis predicts that elections associated with higher degree of political uncertainty would induce more firms to acquire foreign targets. To test this prediction, we first set a -Reappointment‖ dummy to one if the winner is incumbent leader and the vote difference is greater than the first quartile value of the sample distribution and a -New leader‖ dummy to one if the winner is a new leader and the vote difference is greater than the first quartile value of the sample distribution, where vote difference is defined as the difference between the proportion of the votes garnered by the winner and that received by the runner-up. Then, we include the interaction between these two dummies with one year before election dummy in the regression. Panel B of Table 5 reports the results.
Consistent with the prediction, elections that have a high likelihood of reappointing incumbent leader is associated less outbound cross-border M&As before election, and election that are very likely to have a new leader is associated with more outbound cross-border M&As. These results provides further support for uncertainty diversifying hypothesis.
Country-Pairs Analysis
Country-pair level main results
Our data set allows us to test our hypotheses using bilateral M&A activity. We focus exclusively on cross-border M&As in the tests. The country-pair regression specification is
Ln(Numbe of cross-border M&A) pair One year before election
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of one plus the total number of cross-border deals in year t in which the acquirer is from country i and the target is from country j (where i ≠ j). One year before election equals one if the deal announcement year is the year just prior to acquirer nation's election. The -uncertainty-diversification‖ hypothesis posits that the effect of One year before election (the β1 coefficient) will be positive. Only country-pair-year observations with at least one cross-border deal are included. The other regressors (X) includes the difference in economic development, trade openness, legal origin and investor protection between country acquirer i and target country j, and dummy variables indicating same language, region and religion to control for proximity and familiarity motives in cross-border deals (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Ferreira et al., 2009; Erel, et al., 2012) .
[Insert Table 6 around here] (5) and (6) 
Target country choice
We next focus on acquirer's choice of target nation in the year before acquirer nation's national election. We expect that acquirers from countries with forthcoming elections will choose targets from countries with no elections in the year following the deal announcement. As shown in Column (1) of Table 1 , most of the countries in our sample held three elections between 2001 and 2010 and the national election cycle is usually four-year and pre-determined by constitutional law. As such, multinational firms operating in two countries with overlapping national election cycle would encounter both domestic and foreign political uncertainties. It is important to examine whether the uncertainty diversifying hypothesis is applicable to the target country.
To test this prediction, we estimate specification (2) in two subsamples separated according to whether the target country has a national election in the year following the deal announcement. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 present the results. Consistent with our expectation, the year just prior to the acquirer nation's national election only has positive effect on cross-border M&As in the subsample whose targets are from countries with no national election in the following year. In Column (3), we estimate the volume of cross-border M&As before target nation's election in the full sample.
The result show that the country-pair volume of cross-border M&As is lower when target nation has a election following the deal announcement year. This indicates that acquirers avoid choosing targets from countries that will hold election in the following year where political uncertainty is high. In Column (4), we include an interaction between the dummy variable indicating the year before acquirer nation's election and that indicating the year before target nation's election (One year before election* One year before target nation's election). The result is in the spirit with
Columns (1) and (2). When the target country is not in the year before its national election, the volume of incoming cross-border M&As from countries in the year before its national election is 3.4% significantly higher. While the volume of cross-border M&As is 6.9% lower when both the acquirer country and target country are followed by national elections. These results provide further support for the -uncertainty-diversifying‖ hypothesis.
[Insert Table 7 around here]
Deal-level analysis
In this section, we use deal-level data to investigate whether the year before national election affect outbound cross-border M&As.
Probability of cross-border M&As
We use a Logit regression to examine whether the high political uncertainty before national election makes it more likely that an M&A deal will be cross-border:
(Prob(Cross-borderdeal )) One year before election
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the M&A deal is cross-border and zero otherwise. The independent variable we are interested in is the dummy variable indicating the acquirer is from a country followed by a national election in the next year (one year before election). X denotes both country-pair level and deal level control variables. The country-pair level control variables are the same as in the country-pair tests. Deal level control variables include a related deal dummy and the logarithm of deal value. Country, industry and year dummies are all controlled for. Table 8 presents the results of the Logit regression. As shown in Column (1), the year before acquirer country's election positively and significantly affects the probability that a cross-border bid is made. In Column (2), we include other years around the acquirer country's election. The result is consistent with both country-level and country-pair level tests.
[Insert Table 8 around here]
Does uncertainty-diversifying firm create value?
In this section, we examine the announcement returns for outbound cross-border M&As before national elections. Our hypothesis suggests that investors favor cross-border acquisitions more in the year before domestic national election relative to other periods, if a cross-border M&A transaction helps the acquirer diversify political uncertainty associated with forthcoming election. Therefore, we examine whether acquirers of cross-border acquisitions earn higher abnormal returns on average in the year before election compared to other periods; and higher abnormal returns compared to acquirers of domestic M&As in the year before election.
[Insert Table 9 around here] Table 9 presents the average acquirer announcement cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) in our sample of domestic and cross-border M&As in the year before election and other periods. We use acquirer CARs over a three-day event window (-1, +1) and an seven-day event window (-3, +3) around the deal announcement. The abnormal returns are estimated using market return as the benchmark. As shown in Table 9 , the average three-day (seven-day) acquirer CARs of cross-border M&As is 6.1% (7.3%) in the year before national election, higher than that in other period which is 2.5% (3.2%). In the year before national election, both the three-day and seven-day acquirer CARs of cross-border deals are higher than that of domestic deals which are 3% and 4.2% respectively.
We then examine our expectation by regressing the acquirer CARs of cross-border deals on the one year before election dummy. The estimation results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 . We use the same list of control variables as used in Table 8 . Consistent with the prediction, both CAR(-1,+1) and CAR(-3,+3)
of cross-border deals are significant higher in the year before acquirer nation's election. One average, firms acquiring foreign targets in the year before acquirer nation's election earn 3.4% higher three-day or seven-day CARs compared to those in other periods.
[Insert Table 10 around here]
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 , we run full sample regression and include the interaction term between cross-border dummy and one year before acquirer nation's election dummy. The estimation results show that in the year before acquirer nation's election, acquirer firm of cross-border deals is associated with 5.0% higher three-day or seven-day CARs around deal announcement. Besides, the coefficient of one year before election dummy is negative and insignificant. This indicates that in the year before national election, doing domestic acquisitions doesn't get higher abnormal returns. These results imply that the stock market rewards firms acquiring foreign targets to diversify political uncertainty before domestic national elections.
Conclusions
Our study examines cross-border M&As around national elections. Firms are more likely to acquire foreign targets in the year before domestic national election. This tendency is stronger when the country is more likely to experience higher political uncertainty associated with forthcoming election. We also find that, prior to national elections, acquirers in cross-border M&A deals earn significantly higher announcement returns compared with other periods, while acquirers in domestic M&A deals do not. We conclude that firms diversify political uncertainty internationally before national election through cross-border M&As. This study Pakistan  7  2  9  Peru  1  3 2 2  1  1  1  44  1  56  Philippines  2  1  5  148  2  1 1  1  3  164  Portugal  1  12  2  3 1  1  1  1  1  164  25  3 3  5  223  Singapore  39  5 3 (1) and (2) report the main results, where the dependent variable (Ln(Number of cross-border M&A)) is defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of outbound cross-border deals, and only country-year observations with at least one outbound cross-border M&A deal are included in the sample. Columns (3) to (6) report results of alternative estimation methods. Column (3) reports estimation result of Tobit regression model with logarithm of one plus the number of outbound cross-border deals as dependent variable. Column (4) uses the logarithm of one plus the value of outbound cross-border deals as dependent variable. Columns (5) (Column (6)) uses the annual change of logarithm of one plus number (value) of outbound cross-border deals as dependent variable. One year before election is a dummy variable, taking value of one if the observation year is the year just before acquirer nation's election year and otherwise zero. Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of observations at the country level and year level, and associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Main results Alternative estimation methods (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3) is Domestic ratio, which is defined as the ratio of number of domestic deals to total number of domestic deals and outbound cross-border deals, and Column (4) uses the domestic ratio calculated in term of value as dependent variable. One year before election is a dummy variable, taking value of one if the observation year is the year just before acquirer nation's election year and otherwise zero. Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of observations at the country level and year level, and associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Table 7 Country-pair analysis of the effect of elections on outbound cross-border M&As: target country's election This table presents estimates of the panel regressions of the volume of outbound cross-border M&As of countries followed with national election to countries with/without national election in the following year. The dependent variable is natural logarithm of the number of cross-border deals between country pair, and only country-pair-year observations with at least one cross-border M&A deal are included in the sample. One year before election is a dummy variable, taking value of one if the observation year is the year just before acquirer nation's election year and otherwise zero. One year before target nation's election year is a dummy variable, taking value of one if the observation year is the year just before target nation's election year and otherwise zero. Columns (1) and (2) present estimates of two subsamples classified according to whether the target nation has a national election in the year following deal announcement. Column (3) presents regression result of the volume of cross-border M&As around the year before target nation's election year. Column (4) presents the estimation result of the full sample including the interaction term between the two dummies indicating the year before acquirer and target nation's election. Refer to Appendix for variable definitions. The sample period is from 2001 to 2010. Year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are corrected for the clustering of observations at the country-pair level and year level, and associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) 
Figure 1
This figure presents the average logarithm of the number and value of cross-border M&A transactions for two groups classified according to whether the deal is announced in the year just before acquirer nation's election. Years other than one year before election
One year before election
